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The end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century saw a dynamization of philosophical theory. The Leibnizian-Wolffian terminology that had degenerated into a school philosophy was to be transformed into genetic concepts. This endeavor is also reflected in the German literature of the time. This is why I would like to begin with a famous quotation from Goethe’s Faust:

What’s written is: “In the beginning was the Word.”
I am stopped already—I cannot play the bard.
The value of the word I cannot so inflate,
I must find another way to translate;
If by spirit’s guide my way I find,
It says, “In the beginning was the Mind.”
Consider well what this line means,
Lest at the start you go to the extreme.
Is it mind that makes things take their course?
It should read: “In the beginning was the Force.”
Yet as soon as this is down in writing,
Something warns me it is wanting.
With spirit’s help, I finally solve the need
And write: “In the beginning was the Deed.”

Faust, looking for an answer to all substantial questions of the world,
turns to the speculative charter of the revelatory religion, first by
translating, second by interpreting. The beginning, the principle, can
neither be a mere word nor a mere concept (the meaning as opposed
to the merely phonetic sign), for this would lead to a sterile metaphysics
in which words follow upon words and sentences follow from
sentences. Yet the thing itself would be excluded and all that would
remain is a formal logic without substance. Faust could not have
found an answer of any existential character in a descriptive metaphysics.
‘Force’ represents the new natural sciences’ potential to pro-
vide an answer. But force, too, seems one-sided to Faust. He seems
to be satisfied only with the notion of ‘deed’, which is both practical
and dynamic.

This interpretation of the prologue of St. John’s Gospel is not, by
any means, exclusively to be found in Goethe or in his Faust. As early
as 1775, Herder interpreted the Johannine ‘word’ as “the image of
God in the human soul, thought! word! will! deed! love!” Here
there is also a dynamization. Fichte, for instance, interpreted
the word in the Introduction into the Blessed Life (1806) as ‘Being-there’
(Dasein), as ‘consciousness’, which is necessarily ‘self-consciousness’,
as source of all genesis as such, i.e., as Tathandlung. It was the
French Revolution which, as a radical social change, made clear the
revolutionary potential of this dynamization.

It is philosophy’s task not only to dip into the stream of events,
but also to look over this stream and by reflecting upon it to under-
stand the unfolding events. It was thus inevitable that the notion
of development itself would become an object of philosophical thought,
and this not only in the sense that Tathandlung dominated over fact

and dynamic thought over the dead being. A new topic of philo-
sophical inquiry emerged: how the development of development, the
genesis of genesis, is itself possible.

Hegel discusses this topic in the preface of his Phenomenology of
Spirit, which is why this chapter will focus upon it. The preface is to
a certain extent a conclusion of the reflection on the development
and of the comprehension of this development in its double meaning
of a development of thought and a development of the historical
world.

We shall have to keep in mind, of course, that neither the history
of thought nor the history of the world ended with Hegel. The
dynamic of the historical process has transcended and left behind
the universal claim of his philosophy long ago. For centuries the human
individual, even the bourgeois citizen who came out of the French
Revolution with new self-confidence, has had to bury his dreams of
the sovereignty of human reason. He got caught up in the nationalist
mass state or the de-individualized industrial world of labor. There-
fore we must ask which aspects of a notion of development can have a
productive bearing upon contemporary discussion.

For this purpose, I shall proceed in the following way:

1. I shall first reconstruct the central problem of Hegel’s theory.
The following question will be of prime importance: how can
the wealth of reality be consistent with reason’s claim of
absolute unity? The title of the first part is “Wealthy or Poor?”
2. Hegel develops his theory of development particularly in dis-
cussion with and by disassociating himself from Schelling. The
second part is therefore entitled, “Hegel’s Critique of
Schelling.”
3. It is a characteristic feature of Hegel’s thought that he
develops the notion of development as development of
development. Disassociating himself from Spinoza, Fichte, and
Schelling, he demonstrates that a theory of development can
be consistent only if it takes into account the notion of
subjectivity. The third part of my paper is titled, “Subjectivity as
Development—Development as Subjectivity.”
4. It is not difficult to go beyond Hegel. It seems to be far more difficult to bring his thoughts into play in the contemporary discussion about the mental. Nonetheless, I would like to present some considerations, which may make Hegel’s conception adaptable even though they are not meant to be a contribution to the transformation of Hegel’s philosophy into a *philosophia perennis*. The notion of *development* particularly, with its dynamizing potential, lays the groundwork for some further reflections on the potential of Roderick Chisholm’s analytical position to provide answers. In the final part of this chapter, “The Theory of Subjectivity as a Theory of Development?” I shall limit myself to some pertinent questions.

1. **WEALTHY OR POOR?**

Hegel formulates the starting point of any scientific attitude in the beginning of the *Phenomenology* as the starting problem of his time. One can certainly suppose, though, that this starting point concerns at least one, if not the central, problem of contemporary scientific thought. This problem is the result of an insufficiency of scientific method: the spreading and differentiation of actual knowledge goes on interminably. The whole wealth of contents presents itself to the scientific mind. The peculiar and the odd, the esoteric and the exceptional, fascinate the researching mind. At the same time generality is demanded of it: law, the universal rule, the world formula. There is, between these two tendencies, a seemingly unbridgeable polarity. This is for Hegel first of all a contradiction of philosophy itself, i.e., a contradiction within the historical directions of philosophy: “This polarization seems to be the Gordian knot with which scientific culture is at present struggling, and which it still does not properly understand. One side boasts of its wealth of material and intelligibility, the other side at least scorns this intelligibility, and flaunts its immediate rationality and divinity.” This has a threefold meaning:

   1. The problem lies in the irreconciliability of manifoldness and unity, of the actually known and the immediate principle. The manifold does not seem to be a pejorative notion for Hegel: ‘Wealth’ indicates that the wealth of contents, i.e., the different, no longer exclusively negatively relates to the absolute. ‘Wealth’ also implies the poverty of the merely abstract. Hegel debases abstract unity in comparison to the wealth of contents. He does not one-sidedly decide about the polarity of manifoldness and unity in favor of unity. He does not strive for a metaphysics of unity in which manifoldness is devalued to mere appearance.

2. For this reason, there is a contradiction between two fundamentally different mental approaches to reality: mediating understanding (*vermittlungse Verständlichkeit*) and immediate reason (*unmittelbare Vernünftigkeit*), or the discursive and the reflective approaches.

3. Hegel’s analysis implies that his philosophical contemporaries already knew of this problem and tried to solve it. Hegel refers chiefly to Schelling’s philosophy, which, as a matter of fact, made the first great post-Kantian attempt to theorize comprehensively about the wealth of actual knowledge under the premise of a philosophy of identity. Schelling’s attempt did not suffice, as Hegel demonstrates.

2. **HEGEL’S CRITIQUE OF SCHELING**

Hegel’s polemical critique of Schelling is, to a certain extent, also an appreciation. This may irritate, given the sharpness of the tone. Here, in this prominent passage of the *Phenomenology*, Hegel’s critique should not miss its target. Hegel introduces a dictum, which still sticks to Schelling’s philosophy like a barnacle. It is a witty statement that has become independent and now lives its own life. It says, to be exact, that Schelling’s absolute is like “the night in which all cows are black.” Hegel’s critique was presumably intended to be strong. He sought to distinguish his philosophy from the philosophical system of his former friend. Nevertheless, his critique cannot hide what Hegel owes to Schelling.
Hegel’s diagnosis amounts to the criticism that Schelling subsumed the wealth of the material under a formal and abstract absolute. He tried, in Hegel’s words, to subject everything to the “absolute Idea.” The absolute is for Schelling, or better, for the Schelling to whom Hegel refers, absolute identity. It immediately signifies an impoverishment that the wealth is subjected to this absolutely identical principle. Hegel sees that in Schelling the manifold is devalued to a mere appearance without any substance in itself in comparison to the absolutely identical One. The wealth of shapes and forms is reduced to the original content of the One—like the night in which all cows are black. This leads to a system of philosophy in which all that is different is contained, but not as different: “But a closer inspection shows that this expansion has not come about through one and the same principle having spontaneously assumed different shapes, but rather through the shapeless repetition of one and the same formula, only externally applied to diverse materials, thereby obtaining merely a boring show of diversity.”

Hegel both criticizes and follows Schelling. Schelling’s system is a shapeless movement. Hegel, though, concedes to Schelling that at least he was on the right track to a solution. The wealth of shapes and the absolute identity of the (divine) principle can be reconciled only if their relation is conceived of as static, but as dynamic, i.e., as movement. Hegel criticizes Schelling for applying the principle only externally to the diverse and manifold. Thereby the principle is only endlessly repeated. Movement thus becomes repetition. The material is picked up and then questioned about the relation in which it stands to absolute identity in order to put it into the ordo of the universe according to this criterion. The notion of ‘difference’ wins central importance in this critique, since it is based on Hegel’s view that Schelling cannot understand the difference as difference. According to Hegel, here only the appearance of difference develops itself. Consequently, we can only lead the one and identical through the inessential difference of the different, which, as such, is nothing but the One and Absolute.

In the first paragraphs of the Presentation of My System of Philosophy (Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie), Schelling shows in fact that Reason is in itself, and externally, One, and that all that is, is in it as one and the same. The text of §11 is phrased in a way which is reminiscent of Spinoza: “All that is, is the absolute identity itself.” As clarification Schelling adds: “Everything that is, is as such One. . . . Only the absolute identity is as such, therefore everything is only insofar as it is the absolute identity itself, but insofar as it is not the absolute identity, it is not at all as such.” Difference is thus unsuitable for being; it is always being-less difference, insignificant difference. Everything that is different is thus insignificantly different, and what is significant is exclusively the identity that, in Hegel’s words, is only “boringly repeated” as the different.

This happens, as Hegel explains in another passage of the Vorrede, through a certain methodological formalism:

This formalism . . . imagines that it has comprehended and expressed the nature and life of a form when it has endowed it with some determination of the schema as a predicate. The predicate may be subjectivity or objectivity, or, say, magnetism, electricity, etc., contraction or expansion, cast or west, and life. Such predicates can be multiplied to infinity, since in this way each determination or form can again be used as a form or moment in the case of another, and each can gratefully perform the same service for an other. In this sort of circle of reciprocity one never learns what the thing itself is, nor what the one or the other is.

Hegel exemplifies his critique of Schelling through a polemical analysis of his method. This critique mentions the following in detail:

1. The arbitrariness of the predication. Definitions are arbitrarily assigned to their respective subjects of predication.
2. The circularity of the predication. Definitions are reciprocally said of one another.
3. The predication does not add anything to the knowledge of the thing. One does not find out anything about the thing, for it is covered by the definitions. The thing is not understood in its self-motion but obscured by alien definitions added externally.

Schelling’s method can finally succeed only if the formalized material was previously known.Nature itself dropped a form...
ularly the strange and odd, must already be known if we are to apply the form, the rule, or the law to it. Because of this, the apriorism of Schelling's system proves its opposite in Hegel's eyes; only subsequently does identity accrue to the matter:

The Idea, which is of course true enough on its own account, remains in effect always in its primitive condition if its development involves nothing more than this sort of repetition of the same formula. When the knowing subject goes around applying this single inert form to whatever it encounters, and dipping the material into this placid element from outside, this is no more the fulfillment of what is needed, i.e., a self-originating, self-differentiating wealth of shapes, than any arbitrary insights into the contents.\(^\text{15}\)

3. **SUBJECTIVITY AS DEVELOPMENT—
DEVELOPMENT AS SUBJECTIVITY**

Hegel’s theory puts motion not into the form but into the content itself. The form is not to be brought to the content from outside, but the content itself ought to develop into its manifold contents. Schematic movement, which always only repeats the same as the nonessentially different, is to be replaced with an active development whose material diversity is defined immanently. This means that difference and being-different are immanent and thus receive a necessary character. The wealth of forms is possible only if the difference becomes necessary and if, at the same time, unity gets transformed into developed unity, i.e., an enriched and wealthy unity. The static juxtaposition of unity and difference can represent no permanent and therefore no meaningful relation. It becomes meaningful only through the notion of movement. Because of this, negation becomes the center of Hegel's considerations.

Negation means first of all a limit, a boundary, or a lacking. The negative is the negative of the positive, and therefore not somehow different, but a definitely opposing contradictory part of the relation. This implies a factor of identity: “In Opposition, determinate Reflection, or Difference, is perfected. It is the unity of Identity and

Variety; its moments are various in one Identity, and thus are opposite.”\(^\text{14}\) The look at this oneness—here formally shortened—opens up the perspective of negativity. Negativity is the germ cell of subjectivity. For it implies movement, which can only be produced by negativity and which only comes back to itself through the negation of negation. “When we further speak of negativity or negative nature,” as Hegel puts it in the 1812 *Science of Logic*, “we do not mean the first negation, the boundary, limit, lack, but essentially the negation of nothingness which is as such self-relating.”\(^\text{15}\) Negativity—in contrast to negation—focuses upon the whole, which is not only negation or the negation of negation but the whole of this movement, relation to itself. Negation is deprived of its destructive character by this look at the whole and by its being a process. Even in Fichte and in Schelling, there are considerations where it is precisely negation that is to be blamed for the destructive factor. In Fichte, it is particularly the task of thinking to think negationless unity, for which not even the possibility of plurality exists.\(^\text{16}\) Conversely, in Hegel, negation guarantees the wealth of appearances and makes a self-enriching and developing unity possible qua negation of negation.

Furthermore, Hegel is aware of the genesis of his insight. It does not simply come to light. The idea of a developing movement itself has a development of which Hegel is eminently conscious. In formulating the goal of his system, Hegel knew he was in agreement with Fichte and Schelling. Everything, as Hegel puts it, “turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject.”\(^\text{17}\)

Hegel’s development of the problem starts with Spinoza, who conceived God as substance. This is an attempt at unifying subject and substance. But this standpoint is, according to Hegel, characterized by the shortcoming that self-consciousness does not retain any function for the system; it has merely vanished. It has been abolished without parts of it being preserved. Hegel thus interprets Spinoza in the traditional way of his time that assigned a one-sided, realistic point of view to Spinoza, but already in the context of a theory of subject-objectivity.\(^\text{18}\)

The opposing conception cannot claim an advantage in comparison to Spinoza’s conception. If one holds to “thought as thought...”
this is nothing more but generality as such, a mere simplicity, an undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality.\textsuperscript{19} Against the background of the question about a philosophically radically understood subjectivity, it becomes clear that with this notion one cannot express more than the substance of Spinoza: Spinoza posits extension and thought, the real and the ideal as infinite attributes of the one substance, and as undifferentiated within the substance. The opposition to Spinoza's system emphasizes, first of all, the unity of thought. But it results in the same static connection between substance and subject. By directing itself wholly toward itself, by understanding itself in its unity, it can no longer reach the manifold contents. The wealth of appearances remains external.

Hegel speaks finally of intellectual intuition. It is the immediate unity of thought and intuition and therefore the immediate unity of substance and subject. With this, Hegel obviously targets not only Schelling but also Fichte, who himself occasionally understood \textit{Thutbhandlung} as intellectual intuition. In both cases, Hegel diagnoses a conception which has as its goal the unity of substance and subject. This is in fact the goal of all consistent philosophical systems. But today, Hegel adds, “the question is still whether this intellectual intuition does not again fall back into inert simplicity, and does not depict actuality itself in a nonactual manner.”\textsuperscript{20}

Looking at the consequences of the system outlined, Hegel criticizes the \textit{unreal reality} apart from the \textit{idle simplicity}. This means:

1. Mere unity as the principle of a system cannot at all explain anything genetically. From it follows the empty repetition of the absolute One as the unessential differentiated, for it is mere unity as principle. This is why this unity is idle. It is unmoving and does not develop itself.

2. Thereby reality becomes unreal. This principle dominates the understanding of reality. Simplicity is the essential; the different is merely its appearance. But what is in infinitely manifold ways different is precisely the real reality, which is devalued to an unreal reality by the emphasis on simplicity. The wealth of appearances becomes an unreal wealth.

According to Hegel, all these standpoints have the shortcoming that they do not understand subjectivity as active: “Further, the living Substance is being which is in truth \textit{Subject}, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-thering with itself.”\textsuperscript{21} Here, the different strands of Hegel's argumentation are brought together. The idea of liveliness, which will begin to play a dominant role only in the chapter on Self-Consciousness, implies both the idea of a developing movement and the idea of subjectivity. If \textit{idle simplicity} becomes invested with the liveliness of subjectivity, it becomes developing unity. It is statically exemplified no longer in view of the inessential different, but is itself living difference. It becomes \textit{different from itself}, as Hegel says, in order to unite itself again with itself. A unity that is not idle is the \textit{self-restoring sameness}.”\textsuperscript{22} Hegel thus answers the question of how the concrete wealth of appearances could consistently be reconciled with the universality of thinking in the following way: “This Substance is, as Subject, pure, \textit{simple negativity}, and is for this very reason the bifurcation of the simple; it is the doubling which sets up opposition, and then again the negation of this indifferent diversity and of its anti-thesis [the immediate simplicity].”\textsuperscript{23}

4. \textbf{THE THEORY OF SUBJECTIVITY AS A THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT?}

From a systematic point of view, Hegel's theory of subjectivity may have ceased to be of any great importance. It seems that it can no longer contribute to the explanation of our world. One does not need to be convinced of the death of the subject to reject a philosophical program that insists upon universal validity. Nonetheless, one could argue that one thus throws the baby out with the bathwater. There are certainly reasons for not developing a theory of subjectivity along the old lines. But it needs to be asked if these reasons can justify the refusal to study Hegel's approach. Furthermore, it needs to be asked whether these reasons are also \textit{good} reasons.

Any theory of subjectivity is burdened by the terminology of sub-
jectivity. This makes the discussion about its importance and philosophical relevance enormously difficult. There are many concepts and notions that define the surroundings of theories of subjectivity. It is a waft of mist, an obscure mixture of suspicions, definitions, and traditions. This is why I shall claim for myself the philosopher's right to define notions according to one's own purpose. But I would like to emphasize that my definitions are supported by some traditions. For this reason I offer the following brief explanations.

Subject is either a logical or a transcendental philosophical notion. In the latter sense, it stands for the sum of all those functions and features that are attributed to the cognizing subject. They provide an answer to the question about the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Therefore the 'subject' is not a thing; a theory of subjectivity is not an ontology. The 'subject' does not form the basis; it is not the substance to which the accidents belong as features. The 'subject' does not have a plural; it is meaningless to speak of 'subjects'. One cannot speak of the existence or non-existence of 'subjects' as one can with regard to things.

Self-Consciousness is consciousness which reflects upon itself, i.e., a consciousness of consciousness. An ultimate rational justification of 'self-consciousness' is problematic because it involves a logical circle. It is still to be examined whether infinite regress is not only possible, but also the only possible way of an ultimate rational justification.

The I is the unity of self-consciousness and therefore the unity of a duality. The 'I' is the unity of the thinking I and of the I which is thought of; the I is thus always I in its unity. The I is both empirical, an individual I, the I of a person, and the 'I in general'. There is therefore a difference between 'I' and self-consciousness, because the I implies the idea of unity. There is also a difference between the I and the subject, because, in contrast to the subject, to speak of the I immediately implies my I, even though not my individual I, but the I in general.

The individual is the single person as a single person. Therefore, 'individual' is the counter-intuitive to 'subject', which is in all acts of cognition—as condition for the possibility of knowledge—identical. Conversely, the individual is distinct from any other individual. For the individual, each other individual is different from it and thus another to which the individual refers itself as another.

The person is the individual in the moral and political context. It has certain rights and an inviolable dignity. States, nations, cities, societies, and families consist of persons. It is not very meaningful to speak of 'intersubjectivity' because this notion presupposes that there are several subjects. But it is meaningful to speak of 'interpersonality'. The subject does not have any character, but the individual person does. A person can undergo psychoanalysis. The individual I, his character, his history, and his emotions are inseparably tied to his being a person. I am a person.

In Roderick Chisholm's famous book, The First Person: Theory of Reference and Intentionality, the sentences of the first person are integrated into an ontology which has been called a "Platonic realism of universals."24 This designation is certainly historically problematic but may be accepted for the time being. Chisholm shows that the characteristics a person ascribes to himself or herself cannot be transformed into third-person attributes. This is why direct and indirect attributions are different. Any reference to an object can be understood as an attribution that is mediated by the first person. The first person is the unique and eminent position of the speaker, which has a certain constitutive function for our meaningful predications.

According to Chisholm, ontology deals with what exists, and, he emphatically stresses, what exists in a philosophically strict sense.25 Chisholm's theory starts from the assumption of "individual things" and of "eternal, or abstract objects," such as features, relations, and facts, which also exist in a philosophically strict sense.

Finally, the I belongs to what exists. Chisholm explains self-consciousness on this basis: "One realizes that there is a single thing that has all one's self-presenting properties and that that is the thing which one makes all one's direct attributions."26 Chisholm combines Descartes and Kant. According to Kant, it is not possible to speak of the transcendental apperception as a 'thing'. But Chisholm understands the 'I think' as 'cogito' in the sense of Descartes's 'res cogitantes'. Thereby the historical links come to light, but this does not solve the problem of a philosophical theory of the I. This theory pre-
supposes an actual language and coagulates in the solidification of thingliness. The subject is not a thing, as has been shown, and cannot be part of any ontology. Each ontology of the subject is an obstacle to a dynamic theory of speaking and thinking. The critique of the reduction of speaking to propositional speaking and the emphasis on the exclusive standpoint of the first person are features of Chisholm’s approach which are unconditionally to be shared. Chisholm can avoid the circularity of which classical theories of subjectivity have been accused. The subject cannot think itself; but it can only think something of himself. The self can be object of its attributions, but it is not a part of the content of this attribution. The thinking of thinking—a central place of philosophical endeavor since Aristotle—seems to be the blind spot of epistemology.

A conception of mental features or exclusive ‘I-things’ to which these features are attributed, however, must not replace what is criticized. This is precisely the case of Chisholm’s unmovable unity, which is brought to the plurality of contents without developing itself. In Chisholm, the unity of consciousness is furthermore nothing but a container in which perceptions and ideas, relations and attributions lie next to one another, in no way different from a wooden horse. The ‘I-thing’ is simply not of merely formal nature. It is not merely empty; it has a characteristic synthetic function. It also needs to be examined whether the attributes that Chisholm conceives as abstract entities with an ontological status belong to those contents of which one can only assure oneself by thinking. But to refer to something that exists in a philosophically strict sense means to transform dynamic thought acts into things. The comment, finally, that Hegel assigns the ability to formulate propositions with a characteristic content to pure knowledge, i.e., speculative propositions, should not be suppressed.

The dynamic conception of Hegel proves to be something worth thinking about. To tie negation as the driving force of motion to the self-moving subject is epistemologically more elegant than Chisholm’s model, which is based upon philosophy of language and epistemology and retains its static attributions and self-attributions. Thus linked to the processive character of subjectivity, the philosophy of language can be dynamized in a way that moves beyond Hegel. If the ring holding together Hegel’s conception like an iron chain is blown up, the system and the system idea are transformed into an open structure. Dialectic turns into dialogue. The negation, previously bound to the system, is now directed toward the partner in the conversation, even toward one’s own I as partner. The motion which Hegel conceived of only as development, as development toward the ultimate reconciliation, now turns into a searching groping, into a despairing wandering astray, to the “Bacchanalian revel in which no member is not drunk,” a revel which is dispersed into what cannot be logically anticipated and into infinite particularity and plurality. Yet concealed in this conception of subjectivity is the possibility for the particular individual person to think transindividual thoughts—not as general thoughts but thoughts of equivalent universality.

NOTES

1. I would like to thank Holger Zaborowski for the translation of this essay and Dr. Ian Kaplow for his helpful suggestions.


5. See Jean Hyppolite, “La Signification de la Révolution Française


8. GW9, p. 16; ET, p. 8.

9. See, for example, the Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie (1801) in F. W. J. Schelling, Sämtliche Werke, vol. 4, ed. K. F. A. Schelling (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1859); hereafter cited as SW4.


11. Schelling, Darstellung, p. 119 (“Alles, was ist, ist an sich Eines . . . . Die absolute Identität ist das Einzige, was schlechthin, oder an sich ist, also ist alles nur insofern an sich, als es die absolute Identität selbst ist, und insofern es nicht die absolute Identität ist, ist es überhaupt nicht an sich.”).

12. GW9, p. 36; ET, p. 29.

13. GW9, p. 17; ET, pp. 8–9.


15. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, vol. 11, p. 77 (“Wenn fernerhin von Negativität oder negativer Natur die Rede seyn wird, so ist darunter nicht jene erste Negation, die Grenze, Schranke oder Mangel, sondern wesentlich die Negation des Anderseyns zu verstehen, die, als solche, Beziehung auf sich selbst ist.”)

16. Fichte, GAII, 8, pp. 69–70.